Taiwan lawmakers open legal route for Starlink with security conditions

TAIPEI — Taiwanese lawmakers have advanced a targeted change to telecommunications law that could remove the central ownership obstacle keeping SpaceX’s Starlink out of Taiwan, while leaving the government broad powers to reject or condition any application on national-security grounds.

The Legislative Yuan’s Transportation Committee cleared the amendment on 13 July. It is not yet law, and it neither grants Starlink a licence nor guarantees that SpaceX will apply. Its immediate effect, if passed by the full legislature, would be to create a case-by-case route around rules that SpaceX has resisted while preserving separate requirements for telecom registration, spectrum use and network approval.

A case-by-case escape hatch

Article 36 of Taiwan’s Telecommunications Management Act currently requires the chairperson of a public telecommunications network using regulated telecom resources to hold Republic of China nationality. It limits direct foreign ownership to 49% and combined direct and indirect foreign ownership to 60%.

The committee’s text would add a new provision under which a satellite communications operator could ask the National Communications Commission to waive those restrictions. Approval would depend on an assessment of:

• national security and the security of the public telecommunications network;
• use of spectrum and other telecom resources, as well as overall network planning;
• the development of Taiwan’s telecom industry and services market; and
• other public-interest requirements.

The regulator would subsequently define the application process, supporting documents, conditions and review standards. That distinction matters: lawmakers are proposing an exception that regulators may grant, not an automatic opening for wholly foreign-owned satellite companies.

The committee considered six versions led by legislators from different parties. Its agreed wording drew on proposals from Lin Chun-hsien of the governing Democratic Progressive Party and Huang Chien-hao of the opposition Kuomintang. Legislators from both parties supported moving quickly, although Taiwan People’s Party caucus leader Chen Ching-lung sought a one-month pause, arguing that the security and enforcement provisions needed more work.

The measure must still pass the Legislative Yuan before taking effect. That leaves time for lawmakers to specify the safeguards that would accompany any waiver—and for SpaceX to decide whether the Taiwanese market is commercially or strategically attractive.

A backup designed for the worst day

Taiwan’s interest is driven less by ordinary broadband demand than by the need for communications that could survive an earthquake, cable failure, blockade or conflict. External connections depend heavily on submarine cables, while domestic traffic relies on fibre networks and terrestrial base stations. Satellite links provide a separate path when those systems are damaged or unavailable.

“我們主要目的並不是平時，而是緊急狀況的時候需要。” — Lin Yi-jing, Taiwan’s minister of digital affairs

“Our main purpose is not peacetime; it is for when an emergency occurs,” Lin told lawmakers. He said satellite capacity was intended to supplement rather than replace Taiwan’s extensive 4G and 5G networks.

The government is not starting from zero. The Ministry of Digital Affairs has established emergency connectivity using SES satellites in medium Earth orbit and Eutelsat OneWeb satellites in low Earth orbit. OneWeb equipment was used to restore essential communications for rescuers and stranded people after the April 2024 Hualien earthquake, an operational test later documented by the ministry and Taiwanese news organisations.

Starlink could add another provider and a large, mature low-orbit network. Yet officials say the company has not been eager to enter. Lin told the committee that SpaceX had cited Taiwan’s 99.9% combined 4G and 5G population coverage and the limited room for commercial growth. He acknowledged that the explanation might also be a negotiating tactic.

The unresolved question of control

The ownership barrier is only one part of the dispute. Taiwan must also decide where satellite traffic is routed, whether gateways or equivalent regulatory nodes must be located domestically, how authorities can conduct lawful interception and fraud investigations, and what happens if the operator leaves the market or declines service during a crisis.

The Taiwan Communications Society has urged lawmakers to require a locally accountable legal entity, meaningful domestic operations and cooperation with licensed Taiwanese carriers where local spectrum, telephone numbers or core networks are involved. Its chairperson, Wang Wei-ching, put the issue bluntly: “Satellite services can transcend borders, but corporate responsibility cannot be offshored.”

The concern is sharpened by Musk’s public statements about Taiwan, including his suggestion that it become a Chinese “special administrative zone”, and by Starlink’s role in Ukraine. Musk acknowledged refusing a Ukrainian request in 2022 to activate coverage near Russian-occupied Crimea for an attack on Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, saying he did not want SpaceX complicit in an escalation.

That episode prompted Frank Kendall, then the US Air Force secretary, to argue that governments relying on commercial systems for operations need assurances that the services will remain available. Otherwise, he said, they may be useful in peacetime but cannot be relied upon in war.

Taiwan’s proposed law does not resolve that dependency. It creates room to negotiate it. The consequential decisions would come later—in licence conditions, local-infrastructure requirements, emergency-bandwidth commitments and enforceable continuity clauses. Removing the ownership barrier may bring Starlink closer; determining who controls the connection when it matters most will decide whether it strengthens Taiwan’s resilience.